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Abstract: This article investigates how the Saudi regime 
uses sponsorship to support its educational system in 
Indonesia. The article focuses its analysis on LIPIA 
(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, Institute for the 
Knowledge of Islam and Arab). LIPIA is an Islamic 
institution consistent using traditional Islamic scholarship 
especially those of the Hanbalite schools of thought. This is 
reflected in the entire curriculum the LIPIA has for its 
students. The writer argues that the relationship between 
the sponsor, i.e. the Saudi state, and the sponsorship 
beneficiaries, i.e. students, is patron-client. Nevertheless, it 
involves a wide range of actors thereby allowing the 
diversity of knowledge reproduction. Over the last three 
decades, it has made a big investment on the field of 
education by building Islamic schools and institutes, 
distributing scholarship for Indonesian students, and 
channeling aid for Muslim organizations. It is becoming 
obvious that Saudi uses education as a political strategy to 
maintain its influences over Indonesia. 
Keywords: Shari >‘a, scholarship, Saudi Arabia, salafism. 
Introduction 
Until recently only a few studies have been proposed to account 
the relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Most of them are 
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dealing with pre-modern era.2 While this lack of initiatives in some 
parts can be attributed to the authoritarian nature of the Saudi regime, 
most of the studies have entertained the idea that the relations are 
static and that most of the Saudi education projects are largely directed 
to support state ideology.3 This assumption does not have strong 
evidence. Many things have changed over the last decades. Throughout 
this article I argue that, on the one hand, it is becoming more obvious 
that these relations have been characterized by patron-client relations. 
On the other hand, it involves a wide range of actors thereby allowing 
the diversity of knowledge reproduction.  
This article deals with LIPIA, a Saudi education project and its 
network with Indonesian graduates. These returning graduates are 
currently serving in various positions such as teachers and preachers. 
In the course of time they have maintained relations with Saudi, from 
which they obtain financial supports. It focuses on students who 
studied in Saudi in recent periods precisely in the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s. Their understandings of shari>` ah have changed over the time 
depending on its contexts.  
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country. It has played an 
important role in shaping the politics of regional and global Muslim 
world. This fact attracts Saudi Arabia, which has attempted to become 
the dominant player in Muslim politics. Over the last three decades, it 
has made a big investment on the field of education by building 
Islamic schools and institutes, distributing scholarship for Indonesian 
students, and channeling aid for Muslim organizations. It is becoming 
                                                                
2 Azyumardi Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Network of Malay-
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Pesantren Architects and Their Socio-Religious Teachings” (Unpublished Ph.D. 
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3 Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi Sate: Islamic Voices from a New Generation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gwenn Okruhlik, “Making 
Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” in Quintan 
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obvious that Saudi uses education as a political strategy to maintain its 
influences over Indonesia.  
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic State 
More than any other country in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia is 
identified with Islam. Islam is the religion of the state, its source of 
political legitimacy, shaping state policies, and serving as the moral 
code of society. The formation of the state of Saudi Arabia is a result 
of the political leadership of Muhammad ibn Saud (1702-1765), the 
founder of Saudi Arabia, and the puritan religious group led by 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792).  
Despite that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, its daily politics, 
economics and governance is secular. Saudi is one of the Muslim states 
which has long allied with the Western countries to guarantee its 
survival. It is a rent-seeking state which invites Western companies to 
explore its natural resources. Contrary to this, the ulama have played 
an important role particularly in shaping public policies on education 
and women’s affairs.4  
Articulate Islamic movements in Saudi did not emerge until the 
1970s. The rise of young educated Saudi generation, many of whom 
studied in the West, the availability of technology and communication 
system, the growing fragmentation of authority, perpetuated the 
movements. These movements were aggravated by the two-week 
occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. This occupation, 
led by Juhaiman al-Utaibi and Mohammad al-Qaht}ani, had a great 
impact on its further development. Radical Islamist groups accused the 
regime of having deviated from the straight path of Islam, being 
subjugated to the power of the infidels, resorting to crimes, corruption, 
and violation against the Muslim believers. The rebel can be easily 
oppressed, but clearly revealed the idea that the regime was so 
vulnerable.5  
In response to this, King Fahd sought Islamic legitimacy by 
changing his title from “His Majesty,” to “Custodian of the Holy 
Cities” in 1986. This was followed by his deliberation to tighten up 
                                                                
4 Ibid. 
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public polices and social life. Gender segregation was more profound, 
and the mutawwa (Shari>‘a police) were given more leeway to inspect and 
arrest the dissents. Furthermore, he also proposed major reforms in 
Saudi education system. New campuses and world-class universities 
were built across the country, more scholarship given to students, 
religious shrines refurbished and renovated, and exchange programs 
with Muslim countries including Indonesia set up. All these things 
were made up to bolster the image that Saudi Arabia was center of 
Islamic learning. 
Education Beyond Border 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia sought to promote its 
education system beyond its borders. Universities and institutes 
specializing on shari>‘ah were erected at home and abroad. These 
institutions were made to accommodate the ‘ulama>’ who become state 
notables. This period also witnessed the channeling of Saudi funds to 
other Muslim countries through formal and informal institutions. Most 
of the funds were distributed through Islamic philanthropist 
organizations and humanitarian flags. But since the roles of ‘ulama>’ 
were significant, this project has been affected by a particular religious 
spirit called Salafism.  
LIPIA (Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic) is the first and 
the largest Saudi project in Indonesia. It was founded in 1980 in 
Jakarta. This institute is extremely important since it shapes the 
subsequent transmission of Salafism to Indonesia. This can be seen in 
the fact that most of the Indonesian Salafi leaders previously studied at 
this institute. They are credited of transforming Islamic movements of 
the 1970s and 1980s and linking them to transnational and global 
organizations.  
The foundation of the LIPIA is an uneasy step. It is made possible 
by a number of factors. It goes back to the 1970s when Suharto 
approached depolitization of Islam. Some Islamic organizations in the 
country approached Saudi Arabia. In response to this, Syeikh Abd al-
Aziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a prominent student of Syeikh Abdullah bin 
Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, made a short visit to Jakarta. Mohammad Natsir, 
a prominent Indonesian Muslim figure, welcomed him. He fully 
supported the idea to build an Islamic institute. Natsir was the founder 
of Masyumi (the largest Islamic party during Sukarno’s era and the chief 
executive of the DDII (Indonesian Muslim Promulgation 
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Commission). He approached Indonesian officials, most of whom 
were the high-rank officials of the Department of Religious Affairs.  
Daoed Joesoef, Ministry of Education and Culture and a secularist-
nationalist, refused to give permission to this idea. Alamsjah, Ministry 
for Religious Affairs, who supported the idea, came to Joesoep asked 
the matter. The latter responded that Muslims were already fanatics. If 
they studied at an Islamic institute, they would become even more 
fanatical. Alamsyah slammed Joesoep. This brawl eventually led to 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was 
charged with the operation of the institute.6   
Located in a rent building in Salemba Central Jakarta, still called 
LPBA (Institute for Arabic Teaching), the institute began its mission in 
1980. The class was held in the afternoon, to give the opportunity for 
other students who had activities in the morning. For the first time in 
the Indonesian history, Arabic was introduced to public in highly 
sophisticated manner. All the teachers were natives. They were Arabs 
(Saudi, Egyptian, Sudanese, Yemeni, etc).  
With two-rent buildings located in South Jakarta, LIPIA has now 
more than 2500 students, around 25 percent of them female. It has 
nowadays become one of the main destinations for study. The 
availability of scholarship is really appealing especially for poor 
students. It is obvious that Saudi uses scholarship as a means of 
disseminating its ideology beyond its territorial borders. Whereas 
experiencing various problems at the beginning and gains less attention 
from most Muslim groups, in its further development the LIPIA 
successfully creates network with Muslim organizations. It gradually 
recruits students particularly of the modernist backgrounds such as 
DDII, Persis, al-Irshad, and Muhammadiyah. It is obvious that, having 
the same spirit of puritanism, the modernists are involved in such an 
intensely religious engagement. The traditionalist Muslim group such 
NU is not really involved in such an undertaking.  
As far as the LIPIA is concerned, there are two things necessary to 
be highlighted here. First, it has become the Saudi most important 
institution in Indonesia. Its graduates have played an important role in 
transmitting and disseminating a model of Islam called Salafism by 
creating various foundations working on education and social 
programs all over the country. Second, its graduates have good access 
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to state or semi-state relief organizations and individual philanthropists 
in the Middle East and, as a result, bring home new financial sources.  
LIPIA is a form of state accommodation toward ‘ulama>’. This can 
be seen in the prestigious position of ‘ulama>’ in its structure. They are 
given high salaries, apartment, car, living cost, and tickets for home 
holidays. The professors of shari >` ah are given the highest positions. 
They are charged with the teaching of fiqh, H {adi >th, and us }u>l al-di>n. 
Besides shari>‘ah, Arabic is extremely important. This institute is created 
to promote Arabic as the language of Islam and an international 
language. Thanks to LIPIA, Arabic has been widely used especially by 
Muslim scholars. All the subjects are given in Arabic, and all students 
being required to take Arabic. The Saudis are very dominant within the 
institute. Non-Saudi Arabs such as Egyptians, Sudanese, Yemenis, are 
also important due to their language skills. However, they are paid less. 
Indonesians are at the bottom of the hierarchy. They are paid the least.  
Figure 1: The Salaries of the LIPIA Professors and Staffs (in Saudi 
Riyal) 
Degree/position Saudi Non-Saudi Indonesia 
Doctor 15000-25000 6000-9000 6000-8000  
Magister  3000-4000 3000-4000 
Undergraduate - - 2500 
Staff 13.000-18.000  800-1000 
 
The wide gap between the Saudis and non-Saudis, the Arabs and 
non-Arab, frequently leads to conflict. One of the conflicts which 
raises public attention, at least to some, is the case of Muhammad 
Zaini, a staff working with the institute for more than fifteen years. 
The conflict began when Zaini, a Banjarese, demanded the institute 
raised his salary. At that time he was only paid 800 riyal per month. 
The institute asked him to be patient as the government planned to 
make a new policy. After some time, he found out nothing happened. 
Once again, the institute asked him to be patient a little more. He 
waited for the second time. However, after some times, nothing 
happened. This made him resigned from his position. The bitterest 
experience is that the Saudis never showed respect for others. In his 
protest to the director, he said that only stupid person and a donkey 
who worked in this institute.  
Zaini’s case may reflect a broader picture of the LIPIA 
management. In spite of its modern technology, it is poorly managed. 
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The recruitment of teachers and students involve personal and 
informal ties. This also happens in salary system. According to Zaini, 
the institute does not have a standard for salary payment. Instead it 
depends on negotiation between professors and the institute. The 
highest salary an Indonesian professor has ever obtained is that of 
Salim Segaf al-Jufri, which is 8000 riyal per month. Al-Jufri is one of 
the Indonesian who successfully create links with Saudi. He previously 
studied at Islamic University of Medina and assumed key positions in 
WAMY (World Association Muslim Youth) and International Saudi 
Relief. He has been credited of creating link between Islamic 
organizations particularly founded by the Saudi graduates with donor 
institutions in the Middle East. 
LIPIA has consistently applied the curriculum which orients 
students to acquire a complete knowledge of Islamic traditional 
scholarship. This results in the rigid nature of their religious practices 
e.g. gender segregation, women’s seclusion, and the stress on outward 
disciplines such as having long beards (lih}yah), Arab-style flowering 
robes (jalabiyah), and shortening pants right up ankles (isba>l), and 
women’s wearing a form of enveloping black veil (burqah).  
Furthermore the institute teaches traditional Islamic scholarship 
especially those of the Hanbali school. A collection of Hanbali books 
are found in the library. Students are required to take all courses related 
to this school. Despite other Sunni scholarship are available, the 
collections are limited. Neither the works of al-Ghazali, a Sunni 
theologian and philosopher (d. in 1111), nor those of Ibn Arabi, a 
Muslim mystic (d. 1240), are available. The only classical book available 
and widely used in the institute is Bida>yatal-Mujtahid, composed by Ibn 
Rushd (d. in 1198). Modern Islamic works by the Salafi ‘ulama>’ are 
available. The works of Syeikh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, died 
in 1999, and Syeikh Abdullah al-Uthaimin, died in 2001, are abundant. 
The institute also emphasizes on the importance of the memorization 
of the Koran and the H {adi>th. Some scholarship are given to students 
memorizing the H{}adi>th at most.  
Figure 2: List of the Textbooks in the Faculty of Shari >` ah and Takmi>li> 
of LIPIA Jakarta 
Subject Books Author Madhhab 
The Qur’an 8 chapter   
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Subject Books Author Madhhab 
Fiqh Bida >yat al-Mujtahid 
wa Niha >yat al-
Muqtas }id 
 
Mukhtashar Abi > 
Shuja’ Matan 
Gha >yah Taqrib in 
Fiqh Syafii 
Ibnu Rusyd 
 
 
 
Abu Syuja’ 
Maliki 
 
 
 
Syafii 
H {adi >th Subu >l al-Sala >m 
Sharh } Bulu >gh al-
Mara >m 
Al-San’ani Previously Zaidi 
moved to Zahiri 
Musthalah H {adi >th Taysir Must }alah } al-
H {adi >th 
  
Tafsi >r Fath al-Qadi >r al-
Ja >mi bayna Fanni 
Riwa >yah wa Dira >yah 
Al-Shawkani Previously Zaidi 
moved to Salafi 
Nah }wu Sharh } Ibn Aqi >l li 
Alfiyah ibn Ma >lik 
Awd }a >h}ul Masa >lik li 
Alfiyah ibn Ma >lik 
  
Ushu >l 
Fiqh/Qawa‘id 
Fiqhiyah  
Raudhat al-Nadhi >r 
Wa Jannat al-
Munadhir 
 
Al-Mumta‘a fi al-
Qawa >‘id al-Fiqhiyah 
Ibn Qudamah 
 
 
Muslim bin 
Muhammad bin 
Majid al-Dawsi 
Hanbali 
Tauh }i >d Al-Qaul al-Mufi >d 
‘ala > Kit>ab al-Tauh }i >d 
 
Sharh } al-Aqi >dah al-
Thaha >wiyah 
 
Al-‘Aqi >dah 
Muhammad bin 
Salih al-Uthaimin 
 
Ibn Abd –Uzz al-
Dimasqi 
 
Shalih bin Fauzan 
Ali Fauzan 
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Subject Books Author Madhhab 
Mawa >ris Al-tah }qi >qa >t al-
Mardhiyah fi al- 
Maba >his al-
Fardhiyah 
Shalih bin Fauzan 
ali Fauzan 
 
Tsaqafah al-
Isla >miyah 
Al-Kutub al-
Mukhtalifah 
Rashid al-Rijal  
Masha >dir al-
Bah >thi 
Al-Kutub al-
Mutkhtalifah 
Rashid al-Rijal  
 
As I argued earlier, the Saudi uses scholarship as a means to 
promote its education system. In relation to LIPIA, all students are 
given scholarship (muka>fa’ah) for 200 riyal every month. They are also 
given all textbooks for free. This scholarship is really important 
especially for poor students who cannot afford high education due to 
financial problems. Apart from this, the Saudi also provides financial 
supports distributed through its international organizations for Salafi 
organizations in Indonesia. A Wahdah preacher in Makassar South 
Sulawesi admits that he had been financially supported by the Saudi in 
the mid 1990s. It is heard that a number of prominent Saudi graduates 
have been given kafalah (social security). Saudi Islamic Relief (Hay’at 
Iga>thah al-Isla>miyah al-Sa‘u>diyah) and Saudi Religious Affairs (Mulh}aq 
Di>ni) are central in distributing funds to Salafi communities in 
Indonesia. This does not include funds provided by Middle East 
individual philanthropists whose names can be found in the 
inscriptions on the walls of Salafi mosques across the country.  
Creating Salafi Identity 
Identity is extremely important for the Salafists. It is created 
through several ways, formal and informal. The formal ways consist of 
training in which new cadres are introduced to the Salafi teachings. 
Informal ways consist of all forms of social life. Identity is maintained 
and reproduced through physical appearance, formal and informal 
socialization.  
Gender is highly enforced in all forms of social life. This fact is 
one of the most striking features of the Salafists. In LIPIA, female and 
male students use the library on every other day. Female students are 
taught by female teachers, male students by male teachers. Most of the 
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female students are covering up their bodies (burqah). Some have 
veiling (niqa>b). Dating is prohibited, marriage recommended. If male 
and female students like each other, they could go to seniors or 
teachers to arrange marriage. It should be registered and with the 
notification of parents.  
The ideology of Salafism is further disseminated among others 
through prayer. Prayer is the most important ritual in Islam, and 
mosque serves the locus where identity making is taking place. Despite 
prayer can be performed individually, it is better to perform it 
collectively. By performing collective prayers, students are involved in 
face-to-face communication with others. Conversation, expressions, 
shaking hand, kissing, hugging and patting are quite common and 
ritualized. Performing collective prayer will give deep impact and raise 
strong in-group feelings on each member of the believers.  
Collective prayer, highly recommended, is strategized in such a way 
to directly contribute to identity-making process. Ideally there is only 
one collective prayer for one community in each prayer time. The 
second, the third, the fourth prayer, would only be justified if there are 
reasons to do so. To make all the believers aware of and to give them 
chance to come to the mosque, the intervals between prayer call and 
prayer are made longer. While in non-Salafi mosques, it is around five 
to ten minutes, in Salafi mosques, however, it takes fifteen to thirty 
minutes.  
The numerous collective prayers has been discussed in many Salafi 
publication as to whether it is justified to perform collective prayer in 
one mosque for more than once. To this question, there are several 
answers. First, the second, the third, the fourth collective prayers are 
justified if the capacity of mosque is limited. Second, the second, the 
third, the fourth collective prayers are justified if there is no regular 
imam. Third, it is unlawful if there is a regular imam and the mosque 
can accommodate all the congregants. It is easy to understand this rule. 
By making only one collective prayer, all the members of the 
community are seeing each other thereby contributing to the 
strengthening of their identities.  
The Diversity of Knowledge 
The Saudi education projects involve such a wide range of actors 
as students, teachers, religious scholars, activists. All of them are 
having different interests that make the reproduction of knowledge 
multi-faceted, complex, and ever-changing phenomenon. This is a 
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result that actors have different backgrounds and live in largely 
overlapping social settings. The LIPIA itself has gradually changed to 
adjust to the existing conditions. This can be seen in the fact that it 
begins to get involved in such public discourses as pluralism and civil 
rights.  
Throughout this article, I will use the term Salafism to denote the 
process of the reproduction of knowledge taking place within LIPIA 
and other Saudi-funded institutions in Indonesia. Salafism is a form of 
Islam which calls on the Muslim people to return to the pristine 
sources of Islam. This term has historical precedence that goes back as 
early as the first century of Islamic history. It is also evidently safer and 
more fruitful during my interviews with professor and students. 
Despite that the Salafi groups have different understanding on 
Salafism, they agree on the extent to which Salafism is defined such as 
the primacy of the religious resources such as the Qur’a>n and the 
Sunnah over rational approaches towards religion.  
In regard to religious innovation (bid‘ah), which becomes one of 
the most salient features of Salafism, there have been different ideas. 
Many groups are quite flexible, while others are extremely strict. Some 
Salafi groups use bid ‘ah as a weapon to attack other Muslim groups to 
gain sympathy and popularity. They publish various books on the 
danger of bid‘ah. This strategy seems to have attracted particular 
Muslim groups to join Salafism and become its members. Other Salafi 
groups prefer to take low profile approaches to promote its ideas and 
programs. The controversy of bid‘ah has recently reemerged after the 
rise of Salafim. In the previous times, it divided the modernist and 
traditionalist Muslim groups and brought a deep impact on social and 
political life. The former accused the latter of creating various bid‘ah in 
their religious practices. The latter argued that not all the bid‘ah were 
forbidden. Good bid‘ah (bid‘ah h}asanah) was permissible.  
In the previous times, debates on bid‘ah took place in mosques or 
madrasah. Thus the opposing groups deliberately defended their 
arguments in public spheres attended by ordinary Muslim population. 
Recent debates, however, are taking place impersonally thanks to the 
advancement of technology. The Salafists use internet, CD, radio, 
books, to advocate their ideas. As a result there is no physical contact 
between both groups. As far as I am concerned there has been no 
physical violence between the Salafists and non-Salafists taking place in 
the country.  
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Whether or not the Salafi are interested in such contemporary 
issues as civil right and democracy. This question is crucial since there 
has been suspicion among other Muslim groups against the Salafists 
that the latter might not support civil right and democracy. While these 
issues have never been so intensely discussed, there is a growing 
concern among the Salafists to get engage more seriously in such 
public discourses. In the aftermath of the 9/11, many Islamist groups 
began to discuss, with a varying degree of acceptance, on democracy 
and civil right. This indicates that there has been a constant change on 
the reproduction of knowledge among the Salafists. Nowadays, it is 
hardly surprising that the LIPIA holds seminar in cooperation with 
Indonesian police in an attempt to combat terrorism and radicalism 
that sparks upon the country over a decade. This development brought 
about a deep impact on other Salafi groups.  
Based on my interviews, the Salafists oppose the term democracy. 
This term, they believe, is a Western concept alien to Islam. Instead 
they propose the term ahl al-h}all wa al-‘aqd, literally meaning the 
commission having the right to legislate and abrogate the laws, a 
concept quite similar to ‘indirect democracy’ in the Western sense. The 
Salafists oppose ‘direct democracy’ since it likens a learned person 
having the knowledge of God, with a layman. Distancing themselves 
from real politics, the Salafi do not vote during the general election. It 
is hardly ever found that they vote for particular candidates. Despite 
the Salafis prevent formal politics, they argue that it is important for 
Muslim to give advice to the rulers. This is the most common Salafi 
political attitude. Other Salafi groups such as Wah }dah Isla>miyah of 
Makassar consider politics as something important to improve the 
quality of public life. Politics is a means by which leaders are selected 
based on their capacities. This can be seen, for instance, it supports 
Ilham Arif Sirajuddin, the incumbent mayor of Makassar to go for 
gubernatorial election to be held in 2013.  
It is becoming clear that the reproduction of knowledge among the 
Salafists widely vary depending upon their understanding on Islamic 
teachings, backgrounds and social settings. The assumption that 
Salafism is a form of Saudi propaganda is obviously mistaken. This 
assumption simplifies the fact that Salafism has historical precedence 
and always bears the spirit of reform as its salient feature. Moreover, 
the idea that Salafists promote radicalism and extremism on the one 
hand and absolute quietism in another, as reflected in bitterly contested 
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terms such as jihadist versus non-jihadist, do really depict its entirety. 
The entire picture is that it covers up issues ranging from religious 
reform, education, economy, social, and culture. This is not to say that 
Salafism is free from patronage, political propaganda, and its fusion 
with other ideologies. As I said earlier, before reaching Indonesian 
coastlines, Salafism has constantly evolved absorbing locally 
established ideologies.  
The Multiplicity of Shari>` ah 
In the aftermath of 9/11, LIPIA began to get involve in discussing 
such discourses as democracy and civil society.  It was a part of 
campaign against terrorism. Many Islamic organizations were 
encouraged to get engage in this campaign. This period witnessed the 
rise of public awareness of the danger of terrorism and radicalism. 
Programs and research on terrorism had been made. It was for the first 
time a large number of Islamic organizations discussed more seriously 
such issues. Before that these issues had never been given enough 
attention especially by the Islamists. LIPIA was frequently invited by 
authorities such as Contra-terrorism National Office (BNPT) to 
discuss the effective ways to combat radicalism and terrorism.  
It is very likely that LIPIA is concerned with the fact that some 
people have been suspicious towards the institute as it might have 
promoted radicalism and extremism in the country. It therefore holds 
seminar and conference to explain to the public that it has nothing to 
do with terrorism and radicalism. It also made several roadshows to 
Islamic high schools and pesantren to recruit students. These attempts 
are positive and reassure the public that the institute is not charged 
with those allegations.  
Most of the LIPIA students oppose liberalism promoted young 
Muslim intellectuals associated with Islamic Liberal Network (JIL). 
This issue is particularly emotional as its main figure, Ulil Abshar 
Abdallah, previously studied at LIPIA. Having a traditionalist NU 
background, Ulil continued his education at LIPIA but dropped out 
before he finished it. This opposition is found in their personal blogs, 
facebook, and twitter. Some students even publish books to oppose 
the danger of liberal Islam. The controversy of Ulil does not only 
attract LIPIA students, it also divided Muslim groups into two 
opposing camps. The opponent camp even issued a fatwa of 
murdering Ulil.  
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A number of student organizations such as Hizb al-Tahrir, 
KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), HMI 
(Indonesian Student Association) are found within the LIPIA. 
KAMMI is the largest student organization which has link with 
Welfare and Justice Party (PKS), an Islamic political party which 
produce important politicians and bureaucrats. It is obvious that most 
of the students support Islamism, that Islam becoming the alternative 
system for the ummah. However, support for Islamism has recently 
eroded, as more people believe in democracy and civil rights.  Despite 
LIPIA still play an important role in transmitting Islamism and 
Salafism, its influence is particularly limited within a relatively small 
group of Muslim communities. Its position is really marginal in term of 
reproducing Islamic knowledge within larger Muslim audiences. Most 
of the Muslim people still regard the prominence of state Islamic 
universities in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.  
LIPIA has played an important role in creating Salafi schools in the 
country. There have been dozens of Salafi schools built in the country 
over the last two decades. These schools are linked to LIPIA in one 
way or another. Most of them are found in Java. Looking at their 
bases, it is obvious that the Salafists have been successful in creating its 
network in non-traditionalist NU strongholds. In West Java, they 
created network in Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Ciamis, Sukabumi, 
and Bogor. In Central Java, they created network in Yogyakarta, 
Surakarta, Magelang and  Salatiga.  
In the aftermath of Aceh Tsunami in 2005, the Salafi created 
network in Sumatra especially in Banda Aceh. Working with various 
Islamic reliefs, they bought lands and built mosque, schools, and 
boarding schools. It is clear that the Salafi joined the humanitarian 
project together with other Islamic organizations and this project 
linked them to broader international financial sources. In Sulawesi, the 
Salafi network is found in Makassar. This network is made, among 
others, by Wahdah Islamiyah, a leading Salafi organization in the 
region. From Makassar, the network is further developed to 
Kalimantan, Maluku, and Papua. It is important to say that Wahdah is 
founded by the LIPIA graduates and has the largest network in eastern 
Indonesia.  
It is becoming clear that the Salafists have successfully created 
network in province, city, town, and district. This success cannot be 
separated from two modernist organizations, Muhammadiyah and 
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Persis. In the grass root level, the Salafists gain strong support from 
these organizations. They pave the way for the Salafists to advocate 
their ideologies. This may not be surprising if one recalls that both 
Muhammadiyah and Persis have the same spirit of reform. At 
organizational level, the Salafism, Muhammadiyah and Persis have 
made joint project on education. The agreement is that, while the 
Salafists provide fund for building schools, mosques, and dorms, the 
Muhammadiyah and Persis provide lands. This project has been going 
on in several campuses.  
It is found that the Salafists survive due to strong support of 
campus. The Salafists are in fact students previously studied at various 
campuses in the city. They converted to Salafism for several reason. In 
most cases, they converted due to willingness to seek for true Islam. In 
some cases they converted due to friendship, family ties and marriage. 
This fact also reveals the idea that Salafism links to student movements 
of the 1980s. This period witnessed a shift of paradigm after the 
student movements being crushed by the New Order regime. Many 
Salafi members I talked with in this region were former students of 
Gajah Mada University, the main campus in the city. They are now 
becoming active members of Salafi communities. This is the reason 
why Salafi enclaves are found around the city such as Piyungan, 
Banguntapan, and Kaliurang. The same pattern can be found in 
Surakarta, about fifty kilometers from Yogyakarta to the north. In this 
city, a relatively big Salafi enclave is found. They establish schools, 
Islamic boarding schools, etc. Many of them are former students of 
various campuses in this city such as State University of Surakarta 
(UNS).  
The Salafi communities consist of well-educated persons, mostly 
of biology, physics, chemistry, and math backgrounds. They are now 
serving as doctor, paramedic, engineer, and scientist. These persons are 
working together with those who have religious knowledge popularly 
called usta>dh (teacher in Arabic). They previously studied at various 
universities in Saudi Arabia. While the first group uses their knowledge 
and skills to develop the movement further, the second gives 
legitimacy to the movement attracting wider Muslim audiences. This is 
the reason why Salafi movements are so extensive and have far-
reaching consequences.  
In the following sections, I want to briefly discuss the joint project 
between the Salafists and the modernist Muhammadiyah and Persis. 
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This is one of the largest Salafi network in the country that shapes 
many aspects of Muslim communities. As I said earlier, the LIPIA 
graduates link local Indonesian organizations to wider financial 
resources. Thanks to them, many relief organizations create their local 
branches in Jakarta and make humanitarian programs. These programs 
include education, health, social and economic programs, the 
construction of mosque and madrasa, the distribution of the Koran 
and Islamic books, the distribution of sacrificed animal, and the 
donation of food  during Ramadhan.  
Muhammadiyah and Persis are the main modernist organizations 
in Indonesia which have been active so far. Founded in 1912, 
Muhammadiyah has been active on education and social projects. 
Persis was founded in 1923. It had the same concerns with those of 
Muhammadiyah. While Muhammadiyah has been successful in 
establishing schools and universities, Persis had been stuck due to its 
rigidity. It had been focusing on eradicating bid‘ah and given little 
attention to social and education program.  Both organizations are 
seen as having abandoned reform issues which previously became the 
main important agenda. This fact made the leaders of both 
organizations really concerned. It is frequently heard both organiza-
tions did not have good prayer leaders (ima>m), their Qur’anic 
recitations really bad. It is also heard that it is really difficult to find a 
preacher for Friday sermon.  
Muhammadiyah and Persis made cooperations with Middle East 
charity organizations to build Qur’anic schools across the country. 
These schools are largely to train religious functionaries (prayer leaders, 
preachers, Qur’anic teachers, religious teachers). In less than a decade, 
there have been a number of institutes specializing on Islamic studies 
and memorizing of the Qur’a >n. They are built in Jakarta, Bandung, 
Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Malang, Medan, Palem-
bang, Batam, Mataram, Palu, Lampung, etc. After completing their 
training, students are to be sent to areas for religious promulgation. 
Excellent students are given scholarship to continue their advanced 
studies in Saudi Arabia.  
The fact that Muhammadiyah and Persis revitalized tajdi>d (reform) 
demonstrates that this is the most salient feature of Salafi organiza-
tions. This is totally in opposition to the arguments proposed by many 
scholars that Salafism is form of Saudi global politics. While political 
patronage between Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Salafi organizations is 
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obvious, this is by no means that they do not have their own agenda. 
To some extent, they enjoy a great deal of independence so that they 
can create their own agenda.  Equally important is that Saudi financial 
supports and other Middle East countries are limited. They are usually 
given for initial steps mostly for mosque and school constructions. 
Once the projects are completed, local organizations should be looking 
for other resources for survival. In the following sections, I want to 
briefly describe the backgrounds of LIPIA students to determine its 
role in the current Indonesian Salafi Islam.  
LIPIA has become the main destination for Muslim youths 
especially with rural backgrounds. It gives stipend for 200 Saudi riyals 
every month for entire students. It also gives all the textbooks for the 
students for free. This offer means a lot for those who could not 
afford high education in public and private universities. Some 
requirements are applicable for applicants. They should at least 
memorize three chapters of the Holy Koran (the entire Koran 
consisting of thirty chapters) by the time they register. In each 
semester students should add one more chapter. H {ifdh al-Qur’a>n 
(Memorization of the Qur’a>n) is one the traditional methods in Muslim 
communities available until nowadays. Some students claim that they 
also memorize the Sunnah of the Prophet Muh}ammad. The applicants 
are also required to submit a recommendation (tazkiyah) either by 
persons or institutions which have good reputations. Hand-written 
recommendations are preferable. Recommendation should be personal 
and informal. Since the institute creates networks based on personal or 
informal connections, recommendations made by LIPIA alumnae or 
Saudi-link institutions are highly considered.  
Figure 3: The Statistics of LIPIA Students (Total 2350 in 2012) 
School of Origin Economic Background Place of origin Sex 
Islamic 
high 
school 
Islamic 
boarding 
school 
public 
school 
peasant small 
businessman 
labor teacher other rural urban Male  
88 % 
45 % 39% 16% 30% 37% 7% 5% 21% 75% 25% Female 
12%  
Conclusion 
It is obvious that the foundation of LIPIA has political elements. 
From Indonesian side, it is an attempt to support Islamic movements 
after Islam politics being blocked by Suharto. From Saudi side, it is a 
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form of political accommodation of the state toward the ‘ulama>’. 
Through LIPIA, the Saudi state can provide more opportunities for 
the ‘ulama>’ to flourish who in turn provide legitimacy for the state. 
LIPIA is an Islamic institution consistent using traditional Islamic 
scholarship especially those of the Hanbalite schools of thought. This 
is reflected in the entire curriculum the LIPIA has for its students. 
Despite other Sunni madhhab are taught, they are limited to literature 
which are considered relevant for the transmission of knowledge the 
LIPIA promotes. Notwithstanding this, the diversity of knowledge is 
taking place as the institute has a limitation to control students. This 
enables them to create interactions with other groups who have 
different knowledge which in turn affect theirs. Politization of 
knowledge takes place due to the fact that actors have different social 
and historical backgrounds. Actors create knowledge for their own 
benefits. Moreover, the different social and economic status between 
actors also contributes to this diversity.  
The discussion about Salafism frequently stems from a monolithic 
perspective which asserts that this Sunni sect is religiously puritan, 
unchanged, and opposes any possibility of differentiating knowledge. 
While this judgment is baseless, my ethnographic project shows that 
Wahdah Islamiyah has successfully bypassed its critical juncture and 
moved itself to a wider spectrum of knowledge. It is necessary to note 
that the Salafists are not in opposition against modernization. What 
becomes their concerns is that modernity should be based on Islamic 
ethics. At this point what is more interesting and more relevant to 
discuss is that the Salafists seek to push the Islamic traditions and 
practices to the center and challenge modernity.  
The assumption that Salafi groups are dependent on Saudi funds is 
not supported by empirical bases. This relates to the nature of 
donation itself. It is true that charities are distributed to the Salafi 
groups. But they are limited and are only used at the initial step. 
Moreover, the Saudi philanthropists define religious charity in a very 
strict manner. They would only give donation for religious 
construction as the Prophet Muh }ammad said so. Most of the funds are 
largely used for mosque and school construction, others for orphans, 
fasting meals, the distribution of the Holy Qur’a >n and religious books. 
This means that once the Salafi have had their own infrastructures, 
they have to be self-reliant, which means that they have to pay for the 
establishment. Based on my observations, one of the strategies the 
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Salafi makes to resolve this problem is by inviting and involving their 
member to take parts on organizational responsibilities. [] 
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